Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Thomas Metzinger on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Pauen I 246 I/Metzinger/Pauen: (Following Johnson Laird)(1): mental models as the basis of our representation of reality. Perceptual models integrate information from different sensory organs into a representation. Thus, visual information becomes a three-dimensional image. >Sensory impressions, >Representation, Embedding: models can be embedded in each other: Metarepresentation: consciousness results from this. >Model, >Consciousness. Primary model of the hierarchy: the "reality model". Subjectivity: is traced back to the self-model, which can be embedded in the reality model. >Subjectivity, >Reality. I 247 The model is "transparent" with respect to its contents, but not its mechanisms. >Content. From the perspective of the first person it is therefore not recognizable at all that this is a model of the I. >First Person. "Self"/Metzinger: representational fiction. >Self. We are not mysteriously identical with a person and his point of view, but in this sense we have no identity at all. We are internally a more or less strongly correlated set of physical and psychological properties moving through time. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. PauenVsMetzinger: it is unclear whether this already proves the ego to be a fiction. >I, Ego, Self. It is also unclear whether it is really direct introspection that leads us to the fiction of a monolithic ego. >Introspection. 1. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1983). Mental Models. Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Metzinger
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28